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White Coat, Blue Collar: Physician
Unionization and Managed Care
Ellen L. Luepke*
INTRODUCrION
Medicine in modem America has changed and continues to
change. Gone are the days of traditional medicine, when con-
sumers received health care services paid on a fee-for-service
basis by their employers or private health insurance. In the days
of fee-for-service, physicians and patients controlled health care
decisions and insurers, for the most part, simply acted as payers.
Times have changed. Today's health care marketplace is domi-
nated by various permutations of managed care, under which
insurers and other payers exercise increasing amounts of control
over medical care.' The impact of managed care on the chang-
ing methods of health care delivery in the United States cannot
be understated. In 1995, more than 120 million Americans were
enrolled in some type of managed care health plan,2 and eighty-
five percent of American physicians had a contract with at least
* Ellen L. Luepke is an associate in the Chicago office of the law firm of Barnes
& Thornburg, concentrating in regulatory and transactional health care law. Special
thanks to the late Edward Hirshfeld for his assistance and guidance in writing this
Article.
1. See generally American Medical Association-Principles of Managed Care (1998)
<http://www.ama-assn.org/advocacy/principl.htm/> (visited Nov. 14, 1998) (defining
managed care as "processes and techniques used by any entity that delivers, adminis-
ters, and/or assumes risk for health services in order to control or influence the qual-
ity, accessibility, utilization, costs and prices, or outcomes of such services provided to
a defined population"); see also PETER R. KONGSTVEDT, Glossary of Terms, in ESSEN-
TIALS OF MANAGED HEALTH CARE 548 (Kongstvedt ed.) (2d ed. 1997) (defining
managed care as "a system of health care delivery that tries to manage the cost of
health care, the quality of that health care, and access to that care. Common denomi-
nators include a panel of contracted providers that is less than the entire universe of
available providers, some type of limitations over benefits to subscribers who use non-
contracted providers (unless authorized to do so), and some type of authorization
system").
2. See Carol J. Simon et al., The Impact of Managed Care on the Physician Mar-
ketplace, 112 PuB. HEALTH REP. 222, 222 (1997). This estimate includes individuals
enrolled in health maintenance organizations ("HMOs") and preferred provider orga-
nizations ("PPOs").
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one managed care plan. The increasing influx of managed
care into the health care marketplace has profoundly affected
the way Americans receive and pay for care. A necessary corol-
lary is that managed care consequently affects the way physi-
cians practice medicine. Whereas medical decisions were once
an issue for physician and patient only, the managed care model
inserts insurers as an intermediary into medical decision making
and the practice of medicine.4
Although managed care exists under various structures and
organizational models, a few key commonalities predominate.
Managed care organizations ("MCOs") 5 attempt to achieve eco-
nomic efficiencies by providing financial incentives for health
care providers and implementing case control management and
utilization review.6 The introduction of these cost-saving tech-
niques has been termed the "corporatization" of medicine
through which the corporations conduct careful documentation
and review of physician activities and medical outcomes. Some
commentators claim the use of managed care cost containment
mechanisms gives managed care corporations, rather than indi-
vidual patients or physicians, predominant influence over health
care decisions.7 The utilization management process guides a
patient's course of care at all stages of health care decision mak-
ing, from dictating the scope of covered services and prescribing
standardized (and usually limited) lengths of hospital stay for
certain procedures, to restricting or controlling a physician's
ability to refer to specialists or authorize medical tests." MCOs
conduct utilization management at all stages of a patient's
health care, including precertification of procedures, concurrent
3. See David Segal, Doctors Who Dodge a Managed Care Stampede; Fewer Physi-
cians Find They Are Able to Maintain Their Own Fee-for-Service Practices, WASH.
POST, May 20, 1996, at F5.
4. See Simon, et al., supra note 2, at 222.
5. This Article will use the term "Managed Care Organization" as a general term
describing any type of managed care. For a broad discussion of different types of
MCOs and an explanation of their structure and differentiating characteristics, see
generally KONGSTVEDT, supra note 1; James P. Freiburg, The ABCs of MCOs: An
Overview of Managed Care Organizations, 81 ILL. B. J. 584 (1993).
6. See PETER D. Fox, An Overview of Managed Care, in ESSENTIALS OF MAN-
AGED CARE 4 (Kongstvedt ed.) (2d ed. 1997). Other managed care objectives include
promotion of wellness, early diagnosis of disease, patient education, and promotion of
self-care. See id.
7. See id.
8. See John P. Little, Managed Care Contracts of Adhesion: Terminating the Doc-
tor-Patient Relationship and Endangering Patient Health, 49 RuTGERS L. REv. 1397,
1407-08 (1997) (citing THOMAS S. BODENHEIMER & KEVIN GRUMBACH, UNDER-
STANDING HEALTH POLICY: A CLINICAL APPROACH 42 (1995)).
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review while a patient is hospitalized, and finally, retrospective
claims review following the course of care.9 In addition, MCOs
often amass utilization review data to create individual practice
profiles of physicians. Managed care organizations use these
physician profiles to influence contracting and staffing decisions
and as reference in physician credentialing. 10
Many physicians view utilization management and review as
MCOs wielding oppressive power over physician decision mak-
ing at the expense of the physician-patient relationship." Often,
administrative backlog and complex procedural requirements
can delay medical procedures. Additionally, utilization manage-
ment and review may be conducted by non-physicians, leading
one physician to claim, "health care decisions are being dictated
by a 'cookbook class' of accountants. ' 12 The effect of managed
care has, at the very least, affected physicians' autonomy over
decision making and style of practice. 13 The most radical physi-
cian-based opposition to this trend argues that managed care or-
ganizations have taken over health care, destroyed the
physician-patient relationship and decreased quality of care, all
for the purpose of realizing corporate profits. 4
Physicians have reacted to the changes in medicine brought
about by MCOs in various ways. There is a rising degree of
unrest among both employed and independent physicians who
are banding together to form an organized response to what
they perceive as coercive practices by MCOs. This response is
taking shape in many forms, from organized medical society ad-
vocacy, political lobbying and physician-owned Independent
Practice Associations ("IPAs"), to physician unions and collec-
tive bargaining units. Of these responses, a growing number of
physicians have begun to see formal unionization as a valid and
effective response to managed care. Recent success by physi-
cian groups around the nation in organizing and forming unions
9. For an in-depth review of utilization management in the managed care context,
see generally Peter R. KONGSTVEDT, Managing Basic Medical-Surgical Utilization, in
ESSENTIALS OF MANAGED HEALTH CARE 199-224 (Kongstvedt ed.) (2d ed. 1997).
10. See BARRY R. FURROW, ET AL., HEALTH LAW 469-80 (3d ed. 1997).
11. See Robert L. Weinmann, Afraid to Join a Union?, <http://www.uapd.com/
why_bob.htm> (visited Nov. 14, 1998).
12. See Joyce Riffer, Physician Unions Fight Loss of Control, 60 HosPrrALs 82, 82
(Jan. 20, 1986) (quoting Sanford Marcus, M.D., former president of the Union of
American Physicians and Dentists).
13. See John K. Iglehart, Health Policy Report - The American Health Care System
- Managed Care, 327 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 742, 743 (1992).
14. See Weinmann, supra note 11.
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presents an innovative and powerful tool to give physicians bar-
gaining power with MCOs. Additionally, this success may pro-
vide a needed return to physician and patient control over
medical decision making.
This Article outlines and explains physicians' attempts to
form labor unions in order to confront what they perceive as
coercive practices by MCOs. Part I provides a general history of
the rise of physician unions and the reasons for their appear-
ance. It also provides an evaluation of the recent successes and
failures of a few physician union initiatives to collectively bar-
gain and pursue other methods of advocacy. Part II provides a
legal analysis of the barriers to collective bargaining faced by
employed and independent physicians. These legal hurdles in-
volve issues from antitrust and labor law. Part III presents an
analysis of the response of organized medicine, particularly the
American Medical Association and various state and local medi-
cal societies, to the efforts of physicians to initiate collective bar-
gaining with MCOs.
I. THE RISE OF THE PHYSICIAN UNION MOVEMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES
A. Physician Unions Emerge and Wane in the 1970s.
Physicians seem an unlikely population for unionization. As a
group, they are highly educated, generally conservative and
bound by a sense of professionalism 5 and a strict ethical code.
Unlike traditional unionists such as machinists or factory work-
ers, physicians have long held a position of power, even rever-
ence, in American society. In the past, physicians held almost
complete control over the physician-patient relationship, and
there was an overriding sense of paternalism in medical decision
making.16 Put simply, physicians recommended treatment, pa-
15. For an in-depth discussion of the rise and fall of medical professionalism in the
United States, see GRACE BUDRYS, WHEN DOCTORS JOIN UNIONS 32-38 (1997)
(pointing to several factors that may have influenced the professional image of physi-
cians, most notably that they gained monopoly over medical knowledge and success-
fully convinced the public that "medical professionalism was socially desirable").
16. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 1-
29 (1985) (providing an in-depth discussion of the sociological reasons for physicians'
professionalism through social authority and cultural control). Starr argues that phy-
sicians historically have used their status as professionals to legitimate their authority,
gain a monopoly over medical knowledge, and "achieve solidarity among practition-
ers." See id. at 15. Furthermore, he argues that physicians' authority remains because
it has been "institutionalized in a system of standardized education and licensing." See
id. at 19. See also FURROW ET AL., supra note 10, at 454-74.
[Vol. 8
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tients accepted it, and indemnity insurance plans paid the bills.
This long-standing, well-defined process changed, beginning
with the social upheavals of the 1960s and 1970s. During this
period, medicine was among the many social institutions that ex-
perienced a decreasing level of public confidence and a corre-
sponding loss of control, autonomy and decision-making
power.17
The nation's oldest and largest physician union was borne out
of physician frustration and anger at declining autonomy, deci-
sion-making authority and salaries during the early 1970s. The
California-based Union of American Physicians and Dentists
("UAPD") was formed in 1972 and headed by Dr. Sanford Mar-
cus. 18 The Union's charter provides valuable insight as to the
forces behind its formation and purpose:
We physicians and dentists, in order to provide optimum medi-
cal care for people; to insure quality facilities for the provi-
sions of medical care; to enable doctors to give of themselves,
unhindered by extraneous forces, for the welfare of their pa-
tients; to insure reasonable compensation for doctors com-
mensurate with their training, skill and the responsibility they
bear for the life and health of their fellow beings; do establish
this Union.19
During the early to mid-1970s, physician unions experienced a
boom in membership, with 16,000 physician members repre-
sented by twenty-six unions in 1975.20 Most of the early unions
were formed in response to specific actions by hospital adminis-
trators or insurers, including perceived unfairness in contracting
and control, the influx of managed care and utilization review
procedures that physicians found unacceptable.2 1 A poignant
example of the discontent firing the early physician unionization
movement can be seen in a piece of promotional material pro-
duced by the now-defunct Illinois Physicians Union, which was
formed in 1973.22 "Professional freedom is rapidly disappearing.
Dignity, prestige and respect which are the symbols of medical
professionalism have been eroded by insurance carriers and
17. See BUDRYS, supra note 15, at 40-41.
18. See id. at 8-9.
19. Id. at 9 (quoting The Union of American Physicians and Dentists preamble).
20. See id. at 11 (citing Mario Bognanno et al., Physicians' and Dentists' Bargain-
ing Organizations: A Preliminary Look, 98 MorHlEY LAB. R. 33-35 (1975)).
21. See id. at 11-12. The issues spawning collective action included restraints on
how physicians spent their time, peer review, and utilization management procedures,
as well as contracting issues and the rise of managed care. See id.
22. See id. at 12-13 (quoting Dr. George Lagorio).
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governmental agencies desiring to gain control of medical prac-
tice, as well as the biased anti-physician diatribe of the press."'23
Out of the twenty-six unions in existence at the time of the
1975 study, only two remain, the UAPD and the Doctor's Coun-
cil of New York.24 In her book, When Doctors Join Unions,
Grace Budrys attributes the initial failure of the unions in the
1970s to the perceived tension between medical professionalism
and the methodologies typically used by unions, including boy-
cotts and strikes. 25 Budrys also cites differences in opinion about
the types of problems the new unions should address as well as
the methods for resolving these issues.26 As Budrys notes, phy-
sicians during that time formed and joined unions in response to
specific crises; once the crisis was over, the unions tended to dis-
band.27 Furthermore, early physician unions, much like their
modern-day predecessors, were significantly limited by federal
and state antitrust and labor law.28
B. Physician Union Activities in the 1980s and 1990s
The steadily increasing infiltration of managed care has pi-
qued physicians' interest once again in collective bargaining car-
ried out by physician union organizations. The UAPD has
remained a force as the oldest and most established physician
union. Budrys attributes the UAPD's strength and staying
power to the personal efforts of former president and founder
Dr. Sanford Marcus, a dedicated leader who hatched the idea to
form a physician union, actively recruited members and imple-
mented a formal structure that transformed it from a social
movement to a structured, firmly established and recognized
union organization.29
The American Medical Association ("AMA") estimates that
14,000 to 20,000 of America's approximately 700,000 physicians
belong to unions.3 ° Half of those union members are residents
23. Id.
24. See id. at 16-17.
25. See id. at 17.
26. See id. at 58.
27. See id. (noting that the unions that did survive - the UAPD and the Doctor's
Council - had influential and dedicated leadership). Another failed union, the Illi-
nois Physicians Union, lasted only as long as its leader, Dr. Lagorio, was willing to
maintain it.
28. See infra notes 42-55 and accompanying text.
29. See BUDRYS, supra note 15, at 56.
30. See CMA Takes 'Bold' Step by Proposing Guild Development [hereinafter
"CMA"], MED. IND. TODAY, Feb. 19, 1998.
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or interns.3 ' The UAPD currently boasts a membership of
5,000, ninety percent of whom are in California.32 The UAPD
recently affiliated with the American Federation of State,
County, and Municipal Employees, ("AFSCME") in order to
"reduc[e] the corrosive influence of health management execu-
tives over the practice of medicine in the United States. 3 3 Prior
to the affiliation, the AFSCME provided representation to over
350,000 healthcare workers, including 3,000 physicians.3 4
The Florida-based Federation of Physicians and Dentists
("FPD") represents 7,500 physicians, the majority of whom are
in private practice. The FPD represents physicians in Florida,
Connecticut, Ohio, Delaware and Arizona, a6 and is affiliated
with AFSCME and the AFL-CIO.37 The FPD's stated purpose
is to represent private practice physicians' interests in negotia-
tions with insurance carriers, to raise public awareness of physi-
cians' issues through "pro-active litigation, lobbying and
constitutional objectives" and to return the practice of medicine
to physicians.3a
31. It should be noted that residents and interns (collectively known as "house-
staff") have their own separate unions and are embarking on similar attempts to or-
ganize and bargain collectively. The efforts of housestaff are beyond the scope of this
Article. The Committee of Interns and Residents represents approximately 10,000
interns, residents, and attending physicians. See Mary Chris Jaklevic, Physicians Find
Power in Unions: a Small but Growing Number of Docs are Using Organized Labor to
Gain Economic Leverage, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Oct. 6, 1997, at 104. For a general
explanation of housestaff organization attempts, see generally Daniel W. Srsic, Collec-
tive Bargaining by Physicians in the United States and Canada, 15 COMP. LAB. L. J. 89,
105-09 (1993).
32. See Jaklevic, supra note 31, at 104. The UAPD says that it is "equipped to
develop affiliates in other states, and, in fact, [is] in the process of doing just that."
Weinmann, supra note 10.
33. See Toni Vranjes, Unions Team Up to Fight Perceived HMO Abuses, MED.
IND. TODAY, Sept. 5, 1997. The UAPD contends that its alliance with the 1.3 million
member AFSCME will empower it to "counter the megagreed of HMOs that ...
deprive patients of specialty care and treatment by preventing physicians from prac-
ticing the best medicine they can." See id. (quoting Dr. Robert Weinmann, UAPD
president).
34. See CMA, supra note 30.
35. See Jaklevic, supra note 31, at 104. The FPD conducts negotiations for private
practice physicians using the "messenger model," described infra note 117-119 and
accompanying text.
36. See Mary Chris Jaklevic, Physician Union Probe: Justice Department Investi-
gating Boycott Charges, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Feb. 23, 1998, at 6.
37. See Donna Vavala, Fighting Fire With Fire: Physicians Blazing New Paths to
Autonomy, 21 PHYSICIAN ExEcurrvE 3, 3, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Sat. Apr. 1, 1995).
38. For general information regarding the FPD's mission and goals, see Managed
Care: Central Florida Physicians Organize to Negotiate Contracts with Insurers, BNA
HEALTH CARE DAILY, Jan. 3,1994.
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Other physician union organizations include the New York-
based Doctors Council, which represents 3,000 employed physi-
cians in New York City,39 the Physicians Healthcare Networks
Group, with 1,300 members in Naples, Florida40 and the Office
and Professional Employees International Union, which claims
12,000 podiatrists and 2,100 physician members.4 '
II. LEGAL ISSUES SURROUNDING PHYSICIAN UNIONS
The ability of physician unions to represent their members in
negotiations with managed care organizations is dictated and re-
stricted by two bodies of law, labor and antitrust, which gener-
ally have conflicting goals. Antitrust law, codified by the
Sherman Act, seeks to safeguard competition by assuring that
market participants do not act to injure consumers by making
agreements that illegally restrain trade.42 Labor law, on the
other hand, embodied by the Clayton Act, is an exception to
antitrust law that allows labor organizations to represent their
members through collective bargaining."3 The Clayton Act op-
erates by exempting human labor from the definition of a "com-
modity or article of commerce," removing it from regulation
under the Sherman Act and allowing labor organizations to con-
duct the "legitimate objects" of their organization." The Na-
tional Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") defined the labor
exception found in the Clayton Act, and created the National
Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"), an administrative body re-
sponsible for creating, implementing and adjudicating federal la-
bor issues.4 5
The law is fairly clear that employed physicians may bargain
collectively under the Clayton Act. However, self-employed or
independent physicians are prohibited from collective actions by
39. See Jaklevic, supra note 31, at 104. Seventy percent of the physicians repre-
sented by the Doctors Council are employed in the public sector. The Doctors Coun-
cil is not affiliated with a nationwide labor organization.
40. See Debra Galant, In Person; Organized Medicine, N. Y. TIMEs, Jan. 25, 1998,
Sec. 14NJ, at *4. The Physicians Healthcare Networks Group was founded in April,
1997.
.41. See id. The OPEIU is affiliated with the AFL-CIO.
42. See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1997). Violations of Section One of the Sher-
man Act include "price fixing, bid rigging, horizontal market allocations, and certain
types of boycotts," and tying. See Fred E. Haynes, Cooperative Activities of Physi-
cians and Other Health Care Providers: Antitrust Implications, C557 ALI-ABI 273,
277 (1990).
43. See Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1998).
44. See id.
45. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1935).
[Vol. 8
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the antitrust laws, and do not fall under the Clayton Act's labor
exception. The following section explains the antitrust and la-
bor law elements that shape the boundaries and determine the
effectiveness of union representation for physicians.
A. Employee Physicians
An estimated forty-five percent of American physicians are
employed by hospital systems, HMOs, or other corporate enti-
ties on a salaried basis.46 To qualify as an "employee" and gain
the benefits of the Clayton Act, a person must meet the defini-
tion of an "employee" under the NLRA.47 The NLRA excludes
from the definition of "employee" independent contractors and
supervisory employees.48
Employee members of recognized labor unions are entitled
to avail themselves of the protections of the NLRA, including
the right to bargain collectively.49 In order to be recognized as a
union, employees must petition the NLRB for recognition and
the right to form a collective bargaining unit.50 A collective bar-
gaining unit defines the class of employees that will be repre-
sented by the union. The scope and breadth of a proposed
union's collective bargaining unit often is a determinative factor
in whether a particular organization movement is successful.5'
The NLRB has defined5 2 and the U.S. Supreme Court has up-
46. See A.P., Doctors Seeking to Unionize: A Remedy? CHI. TRIB., Feb. 1, 1998,
Bus. Sec., at 10.
47. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1998).
48. See id. In the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress made clear that only those who meet
the traditional test of "employees" will be afforded the protection of the NLRA. See
29 U.S.C. § 152 (1974).
49. Refusal of an employer to bargain with a certified union is a violation of the
NLRA. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1998).
50. See Doreen Mangan, Will Doctor Unions Finally Take Hold?, 72 MED. ECON.
115, *3 (1995). For a detailed discussion of the definition of collective bargaining
units in the health care context, and specifically physician-based collective bargaining
units, see generally Michael H. LeRoy et al., The Law and Economics of Collective
Bargaining for Hospitals: An Empirical Public Policy Analysis of Bargaining Unit De-
terminations, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 20-23 (1992).
51. See LeRoy, et al., supra note 50, at 3-5 (pointing out that management chal-
lenges to the definition of collective bargaining units through litigation often can frus-
trate organization movements by causing delays in certification, thereby impeding the
organizers' momentum and delaying representation elections).
52. See Collective-Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry, 54 Fed. Reg.
16,336, 16,336-48 (1989) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 103). See also Jay Greene, NLRB
Issues Guidelines, MOD. HEALTHCARE, May 20, 1991, at 16 (reporting the issuance of
NLRB guidelines processing union election petitions).
1999] 283
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held 53 eight collective bargaining units for acute-care hospital
employees. Two of these designated units represent employee
registered nurses and physicians, among other groups of em-
ployees.54 If a proposed collective bargaining unit falls within
the parameters of one of the eight groups of employees in acute
care hospitals, as defined by the NLRB, its certification will be
granted. For physicians and others not employed by acute care
hospitals, the NLRB has discretion to recognize collective bar-
gaining unit petitions based on the facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the representation election and the definition of the
collective bargaining unit.55
1. The Tucson Example
A recent example of union activity in Arizona demonstrates
the ability of employee-physicians to successfully organize a
union and bargain with their employers under the protection of
the NLRA. On December 5, 1996, physicians employed by the
Thomas-Davis Medical Clinic in Tucson voted to join the Feder-
ation of Physicians and Dentists/National Union of Hospital and
Health Care Employees, an AFSCME affiliate.56 The Thomas-
Davis medical center is an HMO and group practice that was
once owned by physicians. 7 The physicians sold the medical
group and HMO to Foundation Health Corporation ("Founda-
tion"), a for-profit HMO, in 1994.58 Thomas-Davis Medical Clin-
53. See American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 111 S.Ct. 1539 (1991) (upholding the
NLRB's definition of eight pre-determined collective bargaining units).
54. See Collective-Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry, supra note 52. The
other designated collective bargaining units include technical employees, skilled
maintenance employees, business office clerks, guards and non-professional
employees.
55. In cases when employers agree to recognize the collective bargaining unit, its
composition is not at issue before the NLRB. See LeRoy, et al., supra note 50, at n.10
and accompanying text (citing CHARLES J. MORRIS, ET AL., EDS., THE DEVELOPING
LABOR LAW 413 (1983)). If there is no agreement, the board must determine the
appropriateness of the unit for collective bargaining by analyzing the "community of
interests" represented by the proposed bargaining unit. See MORRIS ET AL., supra, at
413. This decision "frequently depends on detailed factual analysis on a case-by-case
basis, rather than on the simple application of well-settled rules of law." See id. at 417.
56. See Doctors at Tucson Medical Clinic Vote to Join AFSCME Union Affiliate,
BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY, Jan. 27, 1997. See also supra notes 35-38 and accompa-
nying text (describing the Florida-Based FPD).
57. See Mary Chris Jaklevic, Will Doctors Embrace Unions?: Some Predict Rise in
Organizing to Counter Managed Care, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Jan. 20, 1997.
58. See id. (stating Foundation purchased the organization for $720 million).
[Vol. 8284
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ics employed 150 physicians in six locations.59  In the
representation election; ninety-three doctors approved unioni-
zation, while thirty-two voted against representation. 60  The
NLRB certified the physicians' bargaining unit as appropriate in
a hearing in which Foundation participated, and more impor-
tantly, waived the issue of the statutorily supervisory status of
the Thomas-Davis physicians.6 '
Foundation sold Thomas-Davis shortly after the union vote to
FPA Medical Management ("FPA"), a physician practice man-
agement company.62 After the sale, FPA petitioned to re-open
hearings to consider whether the employed physicians were su-
pervisory or managerial personnel. FPA petitioned for rehear-
ing again after the union was certified.63 Because FPA acquired
Thomas-Davis after the representation election, however, FPA
did not have the opportunity to provide evidence at the repre-
sentation hearings. 64 The NLRB held that all of the representa-
tional issues raised by FPA were, or could have been, litigated in
the previous proceeding, even though FPA was not a party to
the original hearing.65 The NLRB also held that FPA did not
offer any new evidence or special circumstances that would
merit reopening the representation hearings.66
FPA requested a bargaining unit clarification from the NLRB
on February 19, 1997, asking that the collective bargaining unit
exclude statutory supervisors and managers.67 The regional di-
rector of the NLRB denied the clarification petition by letter,
stating that the issue of whether the physicians were supervisors
or managers had been fully litigated in the prior proceedings.
59. See Doctors at Tucson Medical Clinic Vote to Join AFSCME Union Affiliate,
supra note 56.
60. See id.
61. See Thomas-Davis Medical Centers, 324 NLRB No.15, 1997 NLRB Lexis 585,
*7-8. The collective bargaining unit was defined as "[a]l regular full-time and part-
time physicians, including department chairs, employed by the Employer at facilities
located in Pima County, Arizona, excluding all other employees, physician medical
directors, assistant medical directors, and members of the Employer's Board of Direc-
tors, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act." See id.
62. See id. FPA is a physician practice management company based in San Diego,
California. See id.
63. See NLRB Orders HMO to Bargain with Physicians Union, Company Ap-
peals, BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY, Aug. 6, 1997.
64. See id.
65. See Thomas-Davis, supra note 61, at *4.
66. See id.
67. See id. at n.3.
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The director upheld the board's decision and certification of the
collective bargaining unit as originally defined.68
The NLRB ordered FPA to bargain with the union in a deci-
sion dated July 24, 1997, finding that FPA had engaged in unfair
labor practices affecting commerce in violation of the NLRA.69
Although the decision did not contain a formal warning to FPA,
as permitted by NLRB rules, FPA attorneys were cautioned for
denying certain allegations without good grounds and filing re-
peated motions to relitigate previously decided issues.7° FPA im-
mediately appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals,
D.C. Circuit.7 '
The NLRB ordered FPA to bargain with the union upon the
union's request.72 FPA continued to refuse to bargain in antici-
pation of their pending appeal. In the meantime, the NLRB
sought, pursuant to its Congressionally granted authority, and
was granted, an injunction to force FPA to bargain pending the
outcome of its appeal.73
After the election of the union, and during the legal maneu-
vering by FPA to contest the physicians' unionization efforts,
FPA made unilateral changes to the physicians' employment re-
lationship. These changes affected the physicians' employment
status and the clinics' day-to-day practice.74 For example, FPA
unilaterally "required bargaining unit physicians to receive au-
thorization before referring patients to other physicians at the
medical center," changed the amount of liability insurance re-
quired and raised the deductible, reduced the amount of bo-
nuses paid to bargaining unit employees and increased
physicians' patient load.75
In addition, FPA attempted to manipulate the bargaining unit
members by offering them new individual employment contracts
with a different compensation level.76 The NLRB claimed irrep-
arable injury in its injunctive proceedings, and pointed to the
fact that after the unilateral employment changes, nearly half of
68. See id. at n.5. See also NLRB Case 28-RC-5449 (holding that the Thomas-
Davis employee physicians are not supervisors or managers).
69. See Thomas-Davis, supra note 61, at n.3, *8-9.
70. See id. at *9-10.
71. See NLRB Upholds Union, 6 BNA HEALTH L. REP. 1234 (1997).
72. See Thomas-Davis, supra note 61, at *12-13.
73. See 29 U.S.C. § 1600) (1998).
74. See Michelle Amber & William Carlile, Despite Challenge to Union, Talks Pro-
ceed Between Arizona Doctors, Clinic, 6 BNA HEALTH L. REP. 1779, 1779 (1997).
75. See id.
76. See id.
[Vol. 8286
12
Annals of Health Law, Vol. 8 [1999], Iss. 1, Art. 11
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol8/iss1/11
Physician Unionization and Managed Care
the physicians in the bargaining unit resigned, and many physi-
cians signed the new individual employment contracts without
the benefit of collective bargaining by the union.77
In his opinion granting the NLRB a temporary injunction,
Judge William Browning held that the union's potential strength
and bargaining power was diminished by FPA's unfair labor
practices, pointing to reduced attendance at union meetings and
numerous physician resignations.78 Judge Browning ordered
FPA to rescind the unilateral changes in the employment condi-
tions of union physicians and restore employment terms as they
were before the December 5, 1996, representation election.79
After the issuance of the temporary injunction, FPA finally
agreed to negotiate a contract with the union.8°
The union's battle with FPA, although successful in establish-
ing the physicians' right to form collective bargaining units, re-
sulted in a pyrrhic victory in the end.81 Although FPA's appeal
was defeated in the federal courts,82 by the time of the decision
FPA had sold or closed all of the Thomas-Davis clinics, forcing
former Thomas-Davis physicians to seek employment in smaller
practices.83 An equally detrimental effect was felt by former
Thomas-Davis patients, some of whom were unable to follow
77. See NLRB Upholds Union, supra note 71, at 1234 (citing Overstreet v.
Thomas-Davis Medical Centers, CV 97-488-TUC-WDB (D.C. Ariz. 1997)).
78. See id. This example is a clear illustration of litigation by employers that is
either designed to or has the effect of frustrating or even destroying unionization
movements. Some commentators argue that litigation during the election and start-
up period of unions can often quash mobilization efforts. See LeRoy et al., supra note
50, at 5-7 (arguing "when litigious hospitals consumed years in appealing Board rul-
ings, ordinary employee turnover often eroded initial organizing gains. In some in-
stances, union supporters were harassed or fired, becoming lessons, perhaps, for the
remaining workers"). Although the LeRoy article focuses mainly on non-physician
hospital employees, it is interesting to note that the same results occur when physi-
cians comprise the collective bargaining unit, as can be seen in the fact that FPA
ignored the NLRB's mandate to bargain with the union, and its unilateral measures
affecting physicians' working environment, and employment terms and conditions.
79. See Amber & Carlile, supra note 74, at 1779.
80. See id.
81. See The Center for Studying Health System Change, Organizational Scenario
Number Three, Thomas-Davis Medical Centers, <http://www.hschange.comlphysconf/
thomasdavis.html> (visited Mar. 26, 1999).
82. See Thomas-Davis Medical Centers v. NLRB, 157 F.3d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
The court, in affirming the NLRB decision, ruled that it was within the NLRB's dis-
cretion to refuse to reopen a previously decided issue and that FPA, through Founda-
tion, had waived the issue of whether the physicians were supervisors. See id. at 912.
83. See The Center for Studying Health System Change, supra note 81.
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their physicians to a new practice and all of whom had to deal
with more complex health care systems.84
2. The Massachusetts Example
Presented with a more favorable situation, employed physi-
cians in Massachusetts were more wholly successful in certifying
a union and gaining a voice in their day-to-day practice than
their counterparts in Arizona. In July of 1997, sixty-eight physi-
cians employed at six outpatient centers by Blue Cross Blue
Shield of Massachusetts voted unanimously to form a union to
be represented by Medical West Physicians Association.8 5 The
movement was in response to Blue Cross' plan to sell some of its
clinics.86 The physicians sought unionization in an effort to in-
fluence which of the several bidders would purchase the clin-
ics. 87 The union was certified by the NLRB without objection
by Blue Cross Blue Shield.88 In fact, a Blue Cross Blue Shield
spokesperson stated that the corporation actually supported the
physicians' unionization effort and collective bargaining unit
election.89 As a result of collective bargaining, the physicians
gained the right to evaluate bid finalists and negotiate certain
purchase terms9° with the eventual purchaser of the clinics.
3. Lessons for Employed Physicians
The Arizona and Massachusetts examples demonstrate the
success physician unions can achieve, under the right circum-
stances, in gaining collective bargaining rights under the NLRA.
Although the Thomas-Davis example resulted in a bittersweet
outcome, certain conclusions can be drawn from the experience.
At the very least, the physician groups in Arizona and Massa-
chusetts have generated nationwide media attention, both in the
84. See id. (noting many patients now had to visit multiple office locations for
different services and were faced with separate billing and medical management
services).
85. See Jaklevic, supra note 31, at 100. Medical West Physicians Association
("MWPA") "has been in existence since 1986, when it was formed to negotiate indi-
vidual employment contracts for doctors at the health centers." See Plan Doctors Seek
Union Representation as Means of Participating in Sales Talks [hereinafter "Plan Doc-
tors"], 6 BNA HEALTH L. REP. 726 (1997). The group's priority is to "assure that any
purchaser [of the clinics] has a commitment to excellent patient care." See id.
86. See Plan Doctors, supra note 85, at 726.
87. See id. The union's organizer, Dr. Powers, noted, "Clearly, this was a last op-
tion. They didn't want to become a labor organization."
88. See Jaklevic, supra note 31, at 99, 100.
89. See Plan Doctors, supra note 85, at 726.
90. See Jaklevic, supra note 31, at 100.
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general and health care trade press.91 Union leaders are touting
the success in forming the collective bargaining unit as a great
stride in creating inroads for union activities to aid physicians in
dealing with MCOs and other employers. Moreover, these ex-
amples demonstrate that the NLRB is willing to recognize sala-
ried physicians as employees entitled to protection under the
NLRA. The exact boundaries of this protection remain to be
seen.
The resolution of the Thomas-Davis case on the waiver issue
failed to settle the debate between physicians and their employ-
ers over whether physicians can be employees, or whether their
position alone puts them in the class of supervisors or managers.
Thus far, neither the NLRB nor the courts have provided a de-
finitive answer to the supervisory issue. The Supreme Court
has held that professional employees are supervisory and are
thus not afforded the protection of the NLRA.92 Some have ar-
gued that physicians' roles are "inherently" supervisory93 be-
cause their position requires them to oversee nurses and
technical staff. The NLRB supported this viewpoint when it
held in the Family Health Plan decision that employed physi-
cians who participated on peer review and other committees
possessed managerial duties and were therefore excluded from
organizing under the NLRA. 94 As the Thomas-Davis case
shows, however, even the Family Health Plan precedent does
not preclude all physicians from unionizing. 95 The Arizona and
Massachusetts cases show examples of circumstances under
which employed physicians can organize and bargain collec-
tively to reach their goals.
91. Newspaper articles regarding physician unions have recently appeared in the
New York Times, Chicago Tribune, and as the cover story in the October 1997 issue of
Modem Healthcare. See, e.g. Doctors Seeking to Unionize: A Remedy?, CHi. TRIB.,
Feb. 1, 1998, Bus. Sec., at 10; Galant, supra note 40, at *4; Jaklevic, supra note 31.
92. See NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672, 684 (1980) (holding that uni-
versity faculty members, although employees, were sufficiently supervisory and not
protected by the NLRA).
93. See Srsic, supra note 31, at 108-09.
94. See FHP, Inc. and Union of American Physicians and Dentists, 274 NLRB
1141, *3 (1985).
95. Staff physicians were similarly granted the right to organize in Joint Diseases,
North General Hospital, 288 NLRB 291, *4 (1988). In Joint Diseases, department di-
rectors were specifically excluded from the bargaining unit. The bargaining unit in
Thomas-Davis similarly specifically excluded physicians in directorship positions. See
supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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B. Independent and Self-Employed Physicians
While it is relatively clear that employed physicians may
unionize and bargain collectively to negotiate with MCOs and
other employers, self-employed or independent physicians face
greater challenges due to the strictures of antitrust law. As
noted previously,96 employees, including employed physicians,
are exempt from antitrust laws under the Clayton Act, and have
the right to collectively bargain under the NLRA. Independent,
self-employed, or non-salaried physicians do not fall under the
labor exception and their efforts to collectively bargain are con-
sidered price fixing or unlawful restraint of trade.97
The main antitrust barrier applicable to physicians' concerns
with managed care involves price fixing. Price fixing is "any
agreement among independent sellers aimed at raising, depress-
ing, or fixing the price of a service or product."98 Such acts are a
per se violation of Section One of the Sherman Act.99 Per se
violations are considered "so patently anti-competitive that they
are conclusively presumed to violate the Sherman Act without
proof of unreasonableness in each case," and can subject the ac-
tors to criminal prosecution.100 The Federal Trade Commission
has recently reconfirmed the potential for illegal price fixing in
the health care context, stating, "It is per se unlawful price fixing
for independent health care professionals to collectively negoti-
ate rates with managed care organizations or other [payers] of
health care services. ' 101
These regulations create a significant barrier for independent
physicians and the unions who purport to represent them. This,
despite the fact independent physicians arguably suffer under
the same perceived abuses of managed care as employed physi-
cians. Managed care contracts are typically non-negotiable.
Additionally, they generally contain strict controls over utiliza-
tion management, reimbursement amounts, financial incentives
and access to specialists. They also may contain termination-
96. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
97. See Haynes, supra note 42, at 278-79.
98. See id.
99. See 15 U.S.C. § 1.
100. See Haynes, supra note 42, at 278-79.
101. See Antitrust: Physicians' Unions, 6 BNA HEALTH L. REP. 1178 (1997) This
statement was made by Robert F. Leibenluft, assistant director for health care in the
FTC Bureau of Competition, in the course of terminating an FTC investigation of a
union of podiatrists.
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without-cause clauses or ambiguous contract terms. °2 Many
physicians and some legal analysts have argued that typical man-
aged care contracts are actually contracts of adhesion because
physicians lack choice and negotiating. 10 3
1. Independent Contractors or De Facto Employees?
Common law agency principles generally govern the differ-
ence between an employee and an independent contractor. 1°4
The key factors in the context of independent physicians include
the degree of control the employer exercises over the worker,
whether the employment is for a distinct occupation or business,
an analysis of the type of occupation involved and whether the
work is usually done under an employer's direction, the skill re-
quired, whether the employer supplies a work place and equip-
ment, and the length of the contract. 10 5 Other factors include
the method of payment and the subjective belief of the parties
as to whether an employment relationship exists.1°6 The AMA,
in a 1997 Board of Trustees Report, concluded that independent
physicians are not eligible for the employment exception under
the Clayton Act and may not collectively bargain with MCOs or
other health plans.10 7
Aggressive physicians and union representatives disagree and
challenge the notion that a physician whose practice is domi-
nated and dictated by various managed care contracts is not an
independent contractor. This group holds the position that the
physician is a de facto employee of the MCO. In the first action
of its kind, nearly 200 private practice physicians who had con-
tracts with AmeriHealth-New Jersey HMO ("AmeriHealth")
petitioned the NLRB for the right to bargain collectively repre-
sented by the United Food and Commercial Workers Local 56 in
Trenton, New Jersey.108 Union leaders argued that although the
physicians were not salaried by AmeriHealth, the conditions of
the managed care contract created de facto employee status.
"The issue is not higher fees, but that the HMOs are practicing
102. See Little, supra note 8, at 1407-20 (providing an in-depth analysis of these
features of managed care contracts).
103. See id. at 1422-25.
104. See AMA BOARD OF TRUSTEEs REPORT 41, at 216, 221 (June 1997).
105. See id. at 222.
106. See id. at 223.
107. See id.
108. See Mary Chris Jaklevic, Unions Pursue New Venue, MOD. HEALTHCARE,
Nov. 3, 1997, at 33.
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medicine without a license," commented Dr. Frederick Nahas, a
union organizer for the New Jersey physicians in Atlantic and
Cape May counties. 10 9 The group sought to "level the playing
field" by regaining control over patient care issues." 0 In Octo-
ber 1997 the physicians petitioned the NLRB for representation.
Dr. Nahas argued, "These doctors are employees, no ifs, ands or
buts. If you don't follow the rules, you are de-selected."'
The physicians' petition was dismissed without a hearing on
January 8, 1998.112 NLRB regional director Dorothy Moore-
Duncan concluded that the physicians were not employees of
AmeriHealth because they "also treat patients from other man-
aged-care companies, insurance companies and Medicare, as
well as walk-in clients who pay independently.' 1 3 Moore-
Duncan acknowledged, however, that there are a few factors
that lend themselves toward an employer-employee relation-
ship, especially the fact that AmeriHealth's physician contracts
are not subject to negotiation." 4 However, after balancing the
factors that distinguish employees from independent contrac-
tors, Moore-Duncan decided that the New Jersey physicians
were independent contractors, concluding that, "most signifi-
cantly, the physicians themselves make the fundamental deci-
sions that determine the profitability of their practices." 115
Another deciding factor, and one argued by the health plan, was
that the New Jersey HMO statute, among other state regula-
tions, set the boundaries of the managed care relationship." 6
The union immediately announced that it would appeal the deci-
sion to the NLRB. Although the dismissal of the petition has no
precedential value, the result of an appeal would be precedent-
setting and could prepare the stage for increased unionization,
or, alternatively, a Victory for managed care.
109. See Richard Acello, Doctors Union Idea is Gaining New Momentum, 18 SAN
DIEGO Bus. J., Nov. 10, 1997.
110. See id.
111. See Linda A. Johnson, Doctors Seeing Labor Unions as Counterweight to
HMOs, CHATrANOOGA FREE PRESS, Jan. 18, 1998, at 04.
112. See Physician Unionization: Ruling Goes Against Jersey Docs, HEALTH LINE,
Jan. 9, 1998.
113. See id. (quoting Dorothy Moore-Duncan's dismissal decision).
114. See Charlotte Huff, Doctors & Unions, United they Fell, Hosp. & HEALTH
NETWORKS, Mar. 5, 1998, at 35.
115. See Physician Unionization: Ruling Goes Against Jersey Docs, supra note 112.
116. See Doctors' Bid to Unionize Rejected, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 9,
1998.
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2. Alternative Strategies for Physician Advocacy
Union activities on behalf of independent physicians have not
always centered on collective bargaining. Unions and independ-
ent groups of physicians have developed alternative strategies
under existing law to accomplish similar goals for their
constituents.
Antitrust regulations prohibit concerted actions that result in
unfair competition. However, physicians may negotiate individ-
ually with managed care companies for their own independent
contracts. In fact, the Federal Trade Commission and the De-
partment of Justice have issued guidelines allowing for a "mes-
senger model" of communication through which representatives
from physician networks or unions may act as messengers in
one-on-one negotiations between physicians and managed care
organizations. 117 This technique was first used by "messenger
model" PPOs and IPAs. In this model the organization "does
not set prices but simply acts as a messenger between the third-
party payer and the individual providers, who settle on price
terms in separate, individual negotiations. '"118
The Federation of Physicians and Dentists has a history of
providing negotiation support for physicians using the messen-
ger model. The FPD reviews managed care contracts with phy-
sicians, but says that "it is up to the individual doctors to accept
or reject a contract."119 However, the union has recently come
under federal antitrust scrutiny for organizing an illegal boycott
after reviewing managed care contracts in Connecticut and Del-
aware. 120 The Justice Department recently requested docu-
ments, alleging that physicians in Connecticut collectively
refused to deal with a health plan.' 2 ' Similarly, Blue Cross Blue
Shield of Delaware is considering filing a federal complaint after
eighty-five percent of the state's orthopedic surgeons canceled
an insurance contract almost simultaneously. 22 The FPD denies
any wrongdoing in either case. Although an investigation is far
from an indictment or prosecution, the presence of these investi-
gations indicates the inherent perils of the messenger model. It
117. See Antitrust: DOJ Cites Price Setting, MFNs as Continuing Antitrust Con-
cerns, BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY, Apr. 30, 1996; see also Harris Meyer, Physicians;
Look for the Union Label, 70 HosPrrALs 69, 69 (1996).
118. See Hayes, supra note 42, at 295.
119. See Jaklevic, supra note 36, at 6.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id.
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is clear that the government is aware of private practice physi-
cians attempting concerted actions, and it seems intent on inves-
tigating potentially illegal boycotts.
III. THE RESPONSE OF ORGANIZED MEDICINE
Organized medicine, led by the AMA and state and local
medical societies, has a history of opposition to unionization by
physicians. In 1984, the AMA Board stated that unions' "tradi-
tional emphasis on collective action through strict majority rule
is ill-suited to professional values of individualism and auton-
omy. Organizationally and philosophically, moreover, the labor
union model comprehends neither of the pursuits that are of
paramount importance to physicians organized in professional
associations-the advancement of medical science and the pro-
motion of public and patient welfare. '123
The AMA's staunch anti-union stance has slowly given way in
response to the realities of managed care. In June 1997, the
AMA House of Delegates mandated efforts to remove barriers
to collective bargaining for physicians. 124 Although the AMA
now supports the right of independent physicians to negotiate
collectively with managed care plans, it continues to resist the
union structure. Instead, the AMA favors alternative legal
structures that will avoid the potential antitrust implications of
collective bargaining for independent physicians.
In response to the mandate from the House of Delegates to
help physicians negotiate with managed care, the AMA created
the Division of Representation to "work with, educate and facil-
itate the county and state associations or independent groups of
physicians to function as physician representation or as an in-
dependent bargaining unit. ' 125 The AMA presented four strate-
gies that state and local medical societies, with the assistance of
the Division of Representation, may choose to pursue in repre-
senting independent physicians. The AMA urges medical socie-
ties to pursue legislative and judicial advocacy on behalf of
physicians using traditional lobbying efforts, a strength of the
123. See BUDRYS, supra note 15, at 118 (citing AMA BOARD OF TRUSTEES RE-
PORT (1994)).
124. See Mary Chris Jaklevic, Wanted: Bargaining Power: AMA Urges Freedom for
Self-employed Docs to Unionize in Response to Managed Care, MOD. HEALTHCARE,
June 30, 1997, at 17.
125. See Jeffrey Barg, AMA Collective Bargaining Program, PHYSICIAN'S NEWS
DIGEST, <http://www.physiciansnews.com/spotlight/1197.html> (visited Nov. 14, 1998)
(quoting AMA president-elect Dr. Nancy W. Dickey).
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organization." 6 Additionally, the AMA urges medical societies
to negotiate noneconomic issues with managed care plans, espe-
cially for issues involving medical decision making and quality of
patient care. 27 Furthermore, the AMA urges medical societies
to provide individual negotiation services for individual
members. 128
The final and most interesting recommendation the AMA
presents is the option of forming a physician-controlled Man-
agement Services Organization ("MSO"), IPA, or risk-bearing
health plan. Additionally, several state medical societies have
introduced their own solutions. In 1986, the Connecticut State
Medical Society formed an IPA/HMO because its members
were concerned that physicians would lose their voice in medical
decision making.129 As of 1994, the organization had enrolled
120,000 patients and contracted with 4,300 physicians.130 Simi-
larly, the Washington Medical Society created a risk-bearing or-
ganization in February of 1994.'1' In early 1997, the
Philadelphia County Medical Society vowed to research and ini-
tiate a physician's union and a Delaware Valley Health Care So-
ciety to provide a stronger voice for physicians in private
practice. 32 In yet another initiative, the Florida Medical Associ-
ation, citing a sense of urgency, resolved to "seek means to re-
move restrictions for physicians to form negotiating units" to
deal with managed care companies and to garner reasonable
fees.133 The UAPD has had an independent non-profit IPA
since 1993, which represents 1,260 private practice doctors in
126. See AMA BOARD OF TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 104, at 224; see also
AMA Delegates Direct Association to Find Ways for Doctors to Bargain, BNA
HEALTH CARE DAILY, July 1, 1997.
127. See AMA BOARD OF TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 104, at 224. The report
states that recent FTC guidelines "create an antitrust safety zone for medical societies
(and other physician groups) to provide medical information to health plans for the
purpose of improving the quality of care or the efficiency with which care is ren-
dered." See id.
128. See id. at 225.
129. See Jim Montague, Joining the Race: State Medical Societies Try to Beat Man-
aged Care Integrators to the Punch, HosP. & HEALTH NETwORKs, Sept. 5, 1994, at 50.
130. See id. at 51.
131. See id. The Unified Physicians of Washington initially contracted with 2,500
physicians at its inception in 1994. See id. at 52.
132. See Doctor Unions: Philadelphia Physician Seeks Organization, HEALTH
LiNE, Feb. 24, 1997.
133. See Physicians: Florida Group to Form "Negotiating Units," HIALTH LINE,
July 10, 1997.
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California and purports to provide access to 3.1 million
patients.3
Perhaps the most radical development in organized medicine
is the AMA's assistance in a labor dispute in Rockford, Illi-
nois. 135 The AMA, along with the Illinois State Medical Society,
backed a 185-member group of physicians in Rockford, Illinois,
in its attempt to obtain certification as a collective bargaining
unit represented by the Rockford Physicians' Council. 36 The
Council's goal was to "establish a forum through which physi-
cians could negotiate on administrative issues affecting patient
care, staffing, access to medical records and contractual rela-
tions.' 37 The AMA provided financial, research, and legal sup-
port through its Division of Representation. 138
The Council filed a representation petition with the NLRB in
December 1997, requesting a certification election. 139 However,
the representation process is stalled due to a January 1998 find-
ing by the NLRB that the employer, Rockford Health System,
interfered with the Council's efforts to organize by threatening
to fire individuals considering affiliation with the Council. 140
Currently, the parties are negotiating a settlement to avoid fur-
ther litigation.' 41 This action by the AMA is significant because
it is a true departure from the AMA's traditional course of rec-
ommending more conservative strategies by traditional organ-
ized medicine groups.
A key point of contention that may threaten fledgling union
and collective advocacy actions by physicians is the potential for
strikes or boycotts traditionally associated with mainstream la-
bor organizations. Although the AMA currently recommends
and permits collective action for physicians, it is adamant that it
will not advocate or tolerate strikes or boycotts that would jeop-
134. See Private Practice and IPA Information, <http://www.uapd.com/IPA.html>
(visited Nov..14, 1998); Weinmann; supra note 32; see also, Antitrust: Steiger Outlines
Safety Zones for Physician Joint Ventures, BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY, Nov. 8, 1994
(demonstrating the limitations of the IPA model, in that any one IPA cannot repre-
sent more than 20% of the physicians in the geographical area due to antitrust
constraints).
135. See Arsenio Oloroso Jr., AMA Backs Docs' Bid to Unionize: Group Scores
Partial Victory in Key Rockford Case, CRAIN'S Cm. Bus., Jan. 19, 1998, at 4.
136. See id.
137. See AMA Backs Physicians' Campaign Seeking to Bargain at Illinois Plan,
BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY, Jan. 23, 1998.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See Oloroso, supra note 135, at 4.
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ardize patient care. 42 It is clear that employed physicians recog-
nized as collective bargaining units under the NLRA have as
much right to strike or conduct other job actions as other em-
ployee groups.143 However, most physician unions and repre-
sentative groups have expressed vehement opposition and a
promise that they will not resort to strikes. 144 Despite these rep-
resentations, there have been a few strikes in the U.S., mainly by
interns and residents, as well as a few incidents involving HMO
employed physicians. 45
CONCLUSION
The reasons offered by union leaders for collective represen-
tation center on a response to managed care, but the precise
goals go well beyond economic concerns regarding salaries and
reimbursement rates. Physicians are concerned about losing
control in medical decisions.146 One fed-up physician recently
noted, "We no longer make decisions ... the mood in the doc-
tor's lounge is one of frustration, depression and anger.' 47 Phy-
sicians also carry concerns that are not as directly related to
patient care, such as timely claims payment and the amount and
type of paperwork managed care plans require them to com-
plete. 48 All of this frustration and anger seems to be coming to
a head as physicians seek representation among a variety of dif-
ferent organizational models.
It may be too soon to tell what effect the recent movements
toward physician unionization and collective action will have on
medicine in the long run. Perhaps the most telling indicator that
real change is occurring is the response of the AMA, typically a
slow-moving, conservative organization. Whatever one's view
of managed care, the consensus is that it is here to stay. In the
long run, managed care cannot work without the cooperation of
142. See AMA BOARD OF TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 104, at 224, 225.
143. See Larry V. Sobal & James 0. Hepner, Physician Unions: Any Doctor Can
Join, but Who Can Bargain Collectively? 35 HosP. & HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN. 327
(1990).
144. Those representing commitments not to strike include the UAPD, the FPD
and the Doctor's Council.
145. See Srsic, supra note 31, at 105-110 (providing a thorough explanation of phy-
sician strikes).
146. See Machinists Union Organizing N.J. Pharmacists, Physicians, BNA
HEALTH CARE DAILY, Feb. 12, 1998.
147. See Galant, supra note 40, at *4.
148. See UFCW Files Petition to Represent Doctors on N.J. HMO Provider Panel,
BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY, Oct. 29, 1997.
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its providers, who are an essential element of managed care's
product - quality, low-cost health care. The historical and more
recent organizational movements may be the first step toward
achieving parity in contracting between physicians and MCOs.
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